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Much of our behavior is focused onminimizing or maximizing a
particular goal state. For example, animals generally seek tomax-
imize food intake and minimize energy expenditure (Stephens
and Krebs, 1986), although some humans strive to achieve the
exact opposite goals. Instrumental to goal-oriented behavior is
the ability to learn and use rules that specify themost appropriate
response under a given set of circumstances. This ability relies on
frontal cortex, an expansive region of the brain that interacts with
other brain regions to select and plan contextually appropriate
responses. Frontal cortical neurons receive and integrate inputs
regarding sensory stimuli, previous responses and rewards, and
behavioral rules (Asaad et al., 1998; Kim and Shadlen, 1999;
White andWise, 1999; Hoshi et al., 2000) (for review, see Fuster,
2000; Miller and Cohen, 2001). Frontal cortex comprises a num-
ber of subregions, many of which appear to contribute to rule-
guided behavior in different ways (Bunge, 2004). Figure 1 shows
the Brodmann areas (BA) in the human brain that correspond to
the frontal subregions that have been implicated in rule-guided
behavior in humans and nonhuman primates.
Our mini-symposium at the 2005 Society for Neuroscience
meeting brings together systems and cognitive neuroscientists
whose research speaks to the neural basis of rule use. Dr. Parker
discusses rule-learning deficits in nonhuman primates associated
with the disconnection of frontal and temporal cortices. Drs.
Hoshi andWallis present electrophysiological data from nonhu-
man primates examining the response profiles of neurons in dif-
ferent parts of frontal cortex during rulemaintenance and execu-
tion. Finally, Drs. Sakai, Brass, and Crone discuss functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies in humans designed
to examine the blood oxygenation level-dependent activation
profiles of specific frontal regions associated with flexible rule
use. Collectively, we seek to understand how rules of varying
levels of complexity are represented in the brain, ranging from
simple stimulus-reward associations to conditional rules to
higher-level task rules.
Reward-based responses
The ability to learn that a given action is associated with a reward,
and to flexibly update this association as needed, relies on orbito-
frontal cortex (BA11). In themonkey, bilateral damage to orbito-
frontal cortex (Izquierdo et al., 2004) or a disconnection between
the amygdala and the orbitofrontal cortex (Izquierdo and Mur-
ray, 2004) disrupts the ability to select a response on the basis of
predicted reward outcomes. Furthermore, electrophysiological
studies in monkeys have shown that neurons in orbitofrontal
cortex andmedial prefrontal cortex (specifically, anterior BA 32)
encode the payoff (Tremblay and Schultz, 2000; Matsumoto et
al., 2003) and costs (Roesch and Olson, 2004) associated with an
action. In humans, damage to orbitofrontal cortex impairs per-
formance on a gambling task in which the goal is to maximize
money (Bechara et al., 1994); this impairment appears to be re-
lated to a deficit in reversal learning or the ability to reverse pre-
vious stimulus–reward associations (Fellows and Farah, 2005).
Damage to dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) (BA 9/46)
in humans also impairs gambling performance, but the underly-
ing cause of this impairment is likely to be attributable to a deficit
in working memory and/or response selection rather than in re-
versal learning per se (Bechara et al., 1998; Fellows and Farah,
2005). In contrast to orbitofrontal cortex, damage to DLPFC or
ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (VLPFC) (BA 44/45/47) in mon-
keys leaves intact the ability to use low-level, reward-maximizing
rules (Dias et al., 1996; Parker and Gaffan, 1998a; Wallis et al.,
2001b). However, DLPFC neurons do encode the identity of a
predicted reward (Watanabe, 1996) as well as its magnitude
(Leon and Shadlen, 1999).
To assess the respective roles of orbitofrontal cortex and
DLPFC in reward-based behavior, Wallis and Miller (2003)
trained monkeys to perform a simple reward preference task and
simultaneously recorded fromboth of these regions. Themonkey
had to choose between two pictures associated with different
payoffs: namely, the delivery of more or less fruit juice. Neurons
in both areas encoded payoff, but neurons in DLPFC also en-
coded the monkeys’ forthcoming motor response to obtain the
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juice. Furthermore, reward selectivity
arose more rapidly in orbitofrontal cortex
than DLPFC. These results are consistent
with reward information entering the
frontal cortex via the orbitofrontal cortex,
in which it is passed toDLPFC and used to
control behavior.
Extending these findings, Wallis and
colleagues (Kennerley et al., 2005) have
examinedhowneurons inmedial prefron-
tal cortex integrate information about the
number of lever presses to earn the juice
reward (cost) and the probability that the
reward will be delivered (risk) in addition
to payoff. Medial prefrontal neurons, un-
like orbitofrontal and lateral prefrontal
neurons, encoded all three decision vari-
ables, suggesting that medial prefrontal
cortex may play an important role in evaluating the costs and
benefits of an action.
Conditional rules
As noted above, lateral prefrontal cortex is not required for re-
sponding on the basis of simple stimulus–reward associations.
However, this region is important for learning and using more
complex rules referred to as conditional rules, whereby case A
requires one response and case B requires a different response
(Murray et al., 2000; Passingham et al., 2000). Parker and Gaffan
(1998a) have conducted disconnection studies in monkeys to
determine which neural interactions are necessary for condi-
tional learning. This work reveals that conditional learning relies
on interactions between prefrontal cortex and inferior temporal
cortex, a region involved in representing visual objects. Monkeys
with a prefrontal-temporal lobe disconnection are still able to
learn stimulus–reward associations but have great difficulty both
in applying previously learned conditional rules and in learning
to apply the conditional rule to new sets of objects. This loss of
flexibility in applying a previously learned rule to new objects can
also be seen in delayed matching to sample performance, in
which crossed lesions of prefrontal cortex and perirhinal cortex
cause a substantial memory deficit (Parker and Gaffan, 1998b).
The most obvious route by which prefrontal and temporal
cortices might interact in conditional learning is via the uncinate
fascicle, the only direct corticocortical tract connecting the fron-
tal and temporal lobes (Ungerleider et al., 1989). However, tran-
section of the uncinate fascicle has been shown not to affect con-
ditional learning inmonkeys (Eacott and Gaffan, 1992). Another
possible route of interaction is through the striatum. While ex-
amining changes in neuronal selectivity associated with condi-
tional learning in monkeys, Pasupathy and Miller (2005) found
rapid changes in caudate neuron selectivity, followed by changes
in behavioral performance and prefrontal selectivity. These find-
ings suggest that the striatum rapidly links object representations
with specific actions, whereas prefrontal cortex learns the re-
warded associations over multiple repetitions.
Rule implementation
Once an action representation has been selected, distinct sets of
selected motor information must be integrated to perform this
action. In the case of arm reaching, two major factors are target
location and choice of arm. Dorsal premotor cortex (the dorsal
part of lateral BA 6) is thought to be involved in integrating these
two types of reach-related information, because it possesses cor-
ticocortical connections both with DLPFC and with the arm/
digits area of primary motor cortex [BA 4 (Lu et al., 1994; Dum
and Strick, 2005)].
Indeed, Hoshi and Tanji (2000) have shown in the monkey
that dorsal premotor neurons initially gather information about
both the target location and armuse, and that subsequent activity
specifies their combination. Thus, dorsal premotor cortex partic-
ipates in integrating distinct motor information, in addition to
preparing future movements (Wise, 1985). Unlike prefrontal
neurons, dorsal premotor neurons tend not to be sensitive to the
identity of visual objects used for motor instruction (Kurata and
Wise, 1988; Mitz et al., 1991; Wallis andMiller, 2003). These and
other findings suggest that prefrontal cortex and dorsal premotor
cortex play fundamentally different roles in rule-guided behav-
ior. Specifically, prefrontal cortex creates novel information for
behavioral selection by processing broad ranges of information
while conforming to behavioral rules, whereas dorsal premotor
cortex integrates multiple types of motor information generated
in prefrontal and parietal cortices and other regions to transform
the selected action representation into a behavioral response
(Tanji and Hoshi, 2001).
Flexible rule use
Themost challenging aspect of rule use is the need to adapt one’s
response to a given context when this response no longer yields
desirable results. Flexible task switching is generally thought to
rely on lateral prefrontal cortex (for review, see Bunge, 2004).
However, fMRI and electroencephalographic studies in humans
also implicate parietal cortex and presupplementary motor cor-
tex (pre-SMA) (medial BA 6) in task switching (Dreher and Ber-
man, 2002; Sohn et al., 2003; Rushworth et al., 2005), and trans-
cranial magnetic stimulation studies in humans have shown that
transient stimulation of parietal cortex or pre-SMA/medial wall
leads to a slowing in the ability to switch from one task to another
(Rushworth et al., 2001; Rushworth et al., 2002). A recent elec-
troencephalographic study in humans shows that activity in the
lateral prefrontal cortex precedes activity in parietal cortex dur-
ing the updating of task rules (Brass et al., 2005b), supporting the
hypothesis that lateral prefrontal cortex provides an abstract task
representation that is then transmitted to, and/or further speci-
fied in, posterior cortices (Brass and vonCramon, 2004; Stoet and
Snyder, 2004).
Bunge, Crone, and colleagues have recently provided fMRI
evidence in humans for the dissociability of two components of
task switching (Crone et al., 2005). VLPFC was primarily associ-
Figure 1. Depicted here are the subregions of the human brain referred to in text. Regions shown on the lateral surface are
orbitofrontal cortex (BA 11; shown in purple), VLPFC (BA 44/45/47; pink), inferior frontal junction (IFJ; gray), DLPFC (BA 9/46; light
blue), anterior prefrontal cortex (BA10; darkblue), anddorsal premotor cortex (BA6; darkgreen). Additional regions shownon the
medial surface are pre-SMA and SMA (BA 6; orange and yellow, respectively) and medial prefrontal cortex (BA 32; red). The
inverted triangles in the IFJ indicate that it is buried in the sulcus. This figure has been adapted from Duvernoy (1991).
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ated with retrieval of the currently relevant task rule, whereas
pre-SMA/SMA and the basal ganglia (caudate nucleus) were
more closely linked to suppression of the previously relevant re-
sponses or response contingencies. Parietal activation reflected
both rule retrieval and task-set suppression demands. Addition-
ally, fMRI data from participants aged 8–25 years provide evi-
dence for different rates of functional maturation of these brain
regions: adult-like patterns in parietal cortex by age 8–12 years
and in pre-SMA/SMA by age 13–17 years but immature patterns
inVLPFCuntil adulthood (Crone et al., 2004). These findings are
broadly consistent with observed developmental trajectories for
task switching and rule retrieval.
In addition to the VLPFC and DLPFC regions discussed
above, Brass, von Cramon, and colleagues have shown using
fMRI in humans that amore posterior region in lateral prefrontal
cortex is also involved in rule use (Brass et al., 2005a). This region,
for which the underlying cytoarchitectonic structure still has to
be determined, is located at the junction of the inferior frontal
sulcus and the inferior precentral sulcus and has therefore been
termed the inferior frontal junction area. A series of fMRI studies
suggests that this region is involved in the environmentally
guided updating of task rules (Brass and von Cramon, 2002,
2004). These findings indicate that several prefrontal, parietal,
and subcortical structures contribute in different ways to flexible
rule use.
Representation of task set
A task set is a neurocognitive state in which an upcoming task is
prospectively configured. It reflects not just which items a subject
is preparing to process but also how they plan to process the items
or the rules of the to-be-performed task. Sakai and Passingham
(2003) have collected fMRI data while subjects performed a task
in which they received instructions in advance of the task stimuli.
They performed functional connectivity analyses showing that
anterior prefrontal cortex (BA 10) activation is closely correlated
with that of different prefrontal regions depending on which task
the subject is preparing to perform. Anterior prefrontal cortex
interacts strongly with a region associated with spatial working
memory, the superior frontal sulcus, when subjects prepare to
perform a challenging spatial task. In contrast, this region inter-
acts strongly with a region associated with phonological working
memory, the posterior VLPFC,when subjects prepare to perform
a challenging verbal task.
In an additional study, presented at the Society for Neuro-
science annual meeting, Sakai and Passingham asked subjects to
make semantic or phonological judgments about words and
found that anterior prefrontal cortex interacted with anterior or
posterior VLPFC depending on whether the subjects were to per-
form a semantic or phonological task. Collectively, these data
suggest that anterior prefrontal cortex assists in preparing for an
upcoming task by coordinating with brain regions that will be
needed to perform that task. Additional fMRI research indicates
that this region represents high-level rules composed of several
lower-level rules, consistent with the hypothesis that VLPFC and
anterior prefrontal cortex are hierarchically organized, with the
latter integrating across representations held in the former
(Bunge et al., 2003; Crone et al., 2005).
Strategy use
Several recent studies have examined the neural substrates of
strategy use: that is, open-ended rules that govern choices at an
abstract level, without specifying the appropriate response to a
given stimulus. Gaffan et al. (2002) trained monkeys to select
specific stimuli either persistently or only sporadically to receive a
reward and showed that the use of these strategies, like condi-
tional rules, relies on prefrontal-temporal interaction through a
different route than the uncinate fascicle. Neurophysiological
studies inmonkeys support these findings. For example, prefron-
tal neurons encode abstract rules such as “choose the object that
is the same” or “choose the object that is different” (Wallis et al.,
2001a). More recently, prefrontal neurons have been shown to
represent high-level behavioral strategies, such as a “repeat-stay”
or “change-shift” strategy (Genovesio et al., 2005). Some of these
neurons had strategy effects that were selective for a specific vi-
sual target, whereas others did not, suggesting that different levels
of abstraction are coded in different sets of prefrontal neurons. In
summary, these results implicate lateral prefrontal cortex in the
maintenance of strategies, in addition to concrete behavioral
rules.
Conclusion
Research on humans and nonhuman primates has led to the
identification of a set of brain regions that mediate flexible rule-
guided behavior. An important next step will be to characterize
the temporal dynamics of interactions between these regions to
gain additional insight into the neural mechanisms of rule use.
Accordingly, studies involving simultaneous electrophysiological
recordings at several sites would prove useful, as would a brain
imaging technique with high spatial and temporal resolution,
such as combined fMRI/electroencephalography. Additional re-
search is also needed to explore the role of language in rule rep-
resentation and to explore the neural basis of behavioral differ-
ences in rule use between species (Stoet and Snyder, 2003). An
additional challengewill be to determinewhether the distinctions
drawn here between various types of rule representations are
honored at the level of brain mechanisms. By studying how rules
are retrieved from memory and used to guide action in specific
situations, we will make progress in understanding the interface
between perception, memory, and motor control.
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